Abstract -Active packets carrying management and control code have a dynamic nature and support dynamic routing. Thus, active packets must be protected in an end-to-end and hop-tohop fashion. In this paper, we present a novel approach, known as Security Protocol for Active Networks (SPAN), which enables an active packet to be securely transmitted during (instead of after) Security Association (SA) and management negotiations along a new execution path.
INTRODUCTION
It was identified in [2] [6] [10] [24] [25] [26] [32] that there is a need for an end-to-end and hop-to-hop security approach for active networks due to the dynamic nature and dynamic routing capability of active packets; details can be found in [2] [32] . This paper suggests that an end-to-end and hop-tohop active network security management protocol must be efficient i.e. to reduce as much as possible the performance overhead generated by hop-to-hop SA establishment. Furthermore, as active packets may traverse through heterogeneous administrative domains, the protocol must be flexible i.e. allows Security Association (SA) negotiations between active nodes of different administrative domains. The protocol must not rely on centralised servers, and should reduce the number of message exchanged and computational processes for key establishment, in order to enhance the scalability of the approach. Furthermore, the protocol should be secure i.e. should support anti-replay and man-in-themiddle attacks; and the protocol should be able to identify legitimate requests from DoS attacks as efficiently as possible [32] . We have discussed existing approaches in [2] [32] . A summary will be provided in this paper. Asymmetric cryptography requires encrypting, creating, and verifying signatures of every modifications on every active packets on every executing node, which is not scalable [2] [32] . Shared key pre-distribution does not support shared key negotiation, and it is not practical to be deployed in a large scale network because each pair of hop must be equipped with different shared keys in order to achieve authentication (essentially the same problem experienced in multicast IPSec [13] ) [32] . The Keying Server (KSV) approach in [6] is not scalable; Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) recommends a set of workarounds for hop-to-hop key establishment [10] [11] [24] but the workarounds doe not scale. In Secure Active Node Transfer System (SANTS) [1] , hop-to-hop key establishment was not addressed. Signed Key Transport (SKT) [5] has limited flexibility. Traditional security management approaches (such as IKE, Kerberos, Oakley, ISAKMP... etc.) must be refined to create less overhead when deployed in a hop-to-hop fashion [32] . The Simple Key Exchange for Active Networks (SKEAN) [32] approach was the first approach that attempts to address practical security management in active networks. However, the initial design of SKEAN did not take into account of DoS attacks. The Just Fast Keying (JFK) [19] protocols claim to be DoS-resistant. However, as we will discuss in later section, our (Fig. 4) . The idea of digitally signing the items listed in Fig. 4 A typical form of replay attack is that the attacker copies a legitimate message, and re-sends the message to one of the peers or other peers. To provide anti-replay protection, all messages exchanged are cryptographically protected. Particularly, randomly generated, never reused, authenticated and integrity protected 128-bit nonces are used [7] [8] , and would enable the protocol to start with weak authentication (of IP addresses) and possibly later performing stronger authentication [27] . However [27] : in the evaluation section, we will show that our approach enables much rapid detection of DoS attacks than existing approaches i.e. less impact on the Responder; 3) the cost of signature verification (at the Responder) can be reduced [29] (or even neglected [28] ) by using carefully selected parameters for asymmetric algorithms: for example use a relatively small public exponent e but larger values for secret prime numbers p and q [28] [29] to achieve quicker RSA signature verification. It was discussed in [28] 
EVALUATION RESULTS
We have developed a prototype of SPAN [12] . PFS is optional [15] because it enables strong security in certain situations [13] , but incurs a high performance overhead because new D-H values are generated [15] . We measured the time it takes to complete one SA establishment (excluding packet execution time which is application-specific). Our These algorithms were chosen for implementing our proof-of-concept prototypes for evaluation purposes only.
